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The case caption includes the names of all persons which
were still parties in this case at the time of trial.
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Harvey Call.
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(R. 1.)

These defendants were represented by

Jackson Howard, for Howard, Lewis & Petersen.
Plaintiff was represented in the initial filing of this
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That

firm withdrew on May

27, 1975.

(R. 77.)
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George A. Hunt,
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& Christensen,

Plaintiffs were represented

at trial by Bryce D. Panzer of the same firm.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JOHN PRICE, for and on
behalf of PRICE-OREM
INVESTMENT COMPANY, a
limited partnership,

PlaintiffAftpei^mt,

Case No. 870550-CA

vs.

Category 14b

ROLLINS. BROWN, & GUNNELL.
INC,, and CARR F. GREER,
an individual,
DefendantsJtespSncteSt.

APPELLANTS BRIEF

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This is an appeal from a Judgment on Jury Verdict entered
after a jury trial.

The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction

over this appeal pursuant

to Utah

Code Ann

§ 78-2-2(3) (i)

(1987), and transferred the case to this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4).

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h).
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Did the trial court err in admitting into evidence an

appraisal based on estimated income of a shopping center, where
actual data concerning the income of the shopping center was
available?

2.

Did the trial court err in denying defendant's motion

for a directed verdict

or for judgment

notwithstanding

the

verdict where the evidence established that construction of the
retail space which plaintiff claimed was lost would have in any
event been in violation of city ordinances because the shopping
center had insufficient parking space?
RELEVANT ORDINANCES
A copy of the Orem City ordinance regarding parking is
attached as Appendix f,D".
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
This is a tort action for damages alleged to have been

negligently caused by defendant^1 error in staking the location
for a building owned by plaintiff.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.
This action was filed on September 9, 1974 (R. 1.), and was

initially tried before the Hon. Maurice Harding, sitting with a
jury, on November 17-19, 1980. (R. 302-05.)

The jury returned a

verdict for plaintiff and assessed damages at $30,000.00. (R.

Although the Amended Complaint names both Rollins, Brown &
Gunnell, Inc., and Carr F. Greer as defendants (R. 88-90), Mr.
Greer had passed away prior to the trial of this matter. (R.
1193.) No evidence was offered against Mr. Greer or his estate
at trial, and it appears that he was implicitly "dismissed" from
the lawsuit sometime prior to trial.
The term "defendant" as used herein shall accordingly refer
only to Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, Inc.

2

252.)

The defendant thereafter made a Motion for Judgment NOV

of in the Alternative Motion for a Remittitur or a New Trial (R.
265), asserting that the damages were excessive because (1) the
evidence demonstrated that the cost of repair at the time the
error was discovered was only $3,000.00, and (2) any additional
retail space would have been in violation of Orem City parking
ordinances.

(R. 266-83.)

The trial

court

held

that the

evidence was insufficient to justify the verdict, and further
held that "there was no culpable negligence on the part of the
engineers" (R. 350), and granted the motion for a new trial. (R.
306.)
The case was rescheduled for trial on March 1, 1983.
381.)

(R.

On the day of trial, the trial court, the Hon. David Sam,

determined that John Price Associates, Inc., was a necessary and
indispensible party to the action.
tiffs

election to not amend

deemed dismissed (id.)#

and

(R. 373-74.)

Upon plain-

its complaint, the action was

the plaintiff appealed. (R. 376.)

The Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for trial.
(R. 400.)

Price-Orem

Investment

Co. v. Rollins, Brown and

Gunnel1. Inc., 713 P.2d 55 (Utah 1986).
The case was again brought to trial before the Hon. Boyd L.
Park, sitting with a jury, on June 1-3, 1987. (R. 661-72.)

The

jury found both parties negligent, and attributed 40% of the
negligence to plaintiff and 60% to defendant.

The jury assessed

damages of $33,861.00, resulting in a net judgment to plaintiff
of $20,316.60 plus costs. (R. 765-67.)
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The Judgment on Jury Verdict signed by the trial court
fixed costs at $894.20. (Id.)

The plaintiff sought an award of

pre-judgment interest (R. 703), which was denied by the trial
court. (R. 763-64.)

Defendant had previously filed a Motion to

Tax Costs (R. 761) , and subsequently filed an Amended Motion to
Tax Costs. (R. 775.)

Upon consideration of the Amended Motion,

the trial court reduced the costs to $297.30.

A Ruling and

Amendment to Judgment reflecting the reduced costs was entered
on September 18, 1987.

(R. 111.)

Defendant filed its Notice of

Appeal on October 1, 1987. (R. 782.)

Plaintiff filed a Notice

of Cross-Appeal on October 15, 1987. (R. 508.)
C.

Statement of Facts.
Sometime during the first part of July, 1973, John Price

Associates, Inc. ("JPA"), contracted with the defendant to have
a survey done of the site of the Orem Plaza, a shopping center
owned and developed by Price-Orem, Investment Company, a limited
partnership. (R. 1323.)

Agents of the defendant performed the

survey in accordance with the terms of the contract.

The first

survey was accurate as of July 27, 1973. (See R. 1823.)

After

the first survey, the plaintiff acquired a second parcel which
overlapped the first survey on the north.

(R. 1323, 1731.)

The

original survey drawing was revised under date August 24, 1973,
to include the newly acquired parcel.

The corner stakes for the

first survey were left in place.
In June, 1974, JPA again contracted with the defendant to
stake the layout of the shopping center building. (R. 1314.)
4

The staking was performed by a crew led by Mr. Thurgood, who was
then an employee of defendant. (R. 1399.)

Mr. Thurgood used as

a starting point a one-inch steel pin imbedded in the ground and
which

was

marked

by

flagging

including a stake labeled
1436.)

and

other

stakes

around

it,

f,

N.W. Property Corner". (R. 1404-09,

Based on that starting point, Mr. Thurgood and his crew

staked the building layout.

The building layout as staked fit

properly on top of fill material which had already been placed
by JPA. (R. 1408-14, 1441.)

JPA continued with construction of

the building in accordance with the stakes placed by defendant.
Later events revealed that the stake used by Mr. Thurgood
was not the corner intended to be used by the owner. (R. 141920.)

It was, however, the northwest corner of the property

originally surveyed.

The corner that was intended to have been

used, apparently because of the subsequent property acquisition,
was about 30 feet to the north of the point used.

As a result,

the building was staked about thirty feet south of the location
called

for on the site plan.

Defendant

presented

several

proposals to plaintiff to correct the problem, which defendant
estimated

would

cost

approximately

$3,000.00.

(R.

1760.)

Plaintiff rejected the proposals (R. 1765), and determined to
adjust for the error by shortening the shop space by 30 feet.
(R. 1299.)

Because the shop spaces as constructed were 70 feet

deep, plaintiff claimed to have lost 2100 square feet of shop
space by reason of the error.
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Plaintiff's evidence concerning the value of the lost space
was given by Ralph Wright, an appraiser, who testified concerning an appraisal he had performed prior to May 26, 1977. (R.
1485.)

The appraisal was based on an assumption that the then-

existing leases or similar leases would continue (R. 1483), and
that the vacancy

rate

in the shopping center would be ap-

proximately 5%. (R. 1504.)

Mr. Wright did not make any adjust-

ments for the high number of vacancies existing in the shopping
center at the time of trial. (R. 1529-40.)

Mr. Wright, using an

income approach to valuation, estimated that the present value
of the lost income over 40 years was $72,351.00. (Ex. 12.)

He

estimated that the cost of constructing the lost space would
have

been

$42,000.00

(R.

1515),

yielding

a

net

loss

of

$30,351.00.
Plaintiff also claimed that it paid $3,000.00 to redraw the
plans

for the

shopping

center

(R. 1292),

$210.00

for some

additional curb and gutter work (R. 1306; see also R. 1834), and
$300.00 for miscellaneous extra piping. (Id.)
Substantial competent evidence was presented concerning the
amount of parking required for the complex.

Both Mr. Brown, who

was the Orem City Engineer in 1974 and who was familiar with the
ordinances relating to shopping center construction, and Mr.
Randall Deschamps, the planning director for Orem City during
the relevant time period, testified that the shopping center as
constructed

did not have sufficient parking

applicable Orem City ordinances.

to comply with

(R. 1646, 1773.)
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant presented uncontroverted evidence that plaintiff
suffered

no damage.

The

shopping

center

as built was in

violation of Orem City ordinances regarding the minimum amount
of parking space required.

Construction of the additional 2100

square feet would have only compounded the violation, and would
have been illegal.

It was error to award any damages for

plaintifffs inability to construct an illegal building.
Even if the plaintiff was entitled to an award of damages,
plaintiff did not present any competent evidence of the damages
actually suffered by plaintiff.

The jury's award of damages was

based predominately upon an appraisal performed in 1977, over
ten years prior to the trial of this case.

The appraisal had

been based on estimates concerning vacancy rates which subsequent events proved erroneous, and in addition used estimates of
the

probable

income

from

the

shopping

center

even

though

information concerning the actual income history of the center
was

available.

Such

evidence

in

inherently

speculative.

Although such evidence may have been admissible if this case had
been tried in 1977, it was irrelevant and inadmissible in 1987.
Plaintiff did not present any competent

evidence concerning

damages, and defendant's motions for a directed verdict and for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict should have been granted.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PLAINTIFF SUFFERED NO DAMAGES.
Substantial competent evidence was presented at trial that
the shopping center, as finally constructed, was in violation of
Orem City Ordinances, in that it had too few parking spaces for
the

amount

of

retail

and

restaurant

space.

Although

the

plaintiff argued that it had been deprived of an additional 2100
square feet of floor space, construction of the additional space
would have been illegal.
It is well established that an award of damages based on
violation

of the law

is against public policy.

There are

numerous occasions in which courts have had an opportunity to
deal with an illegal use.
domain.

One such area is that of eminent

As stated by the Arizona Supreme Court in Gear v. City

of Phoenix. 93 Ariz. 260, 379 P.2d 972 (1963), "the availability
of land for a use which is prohibited by law cannot be considered in determining its value in eminent domain proceedings."
379 P.2d at 974 (citations omitted).
In this case, the ordinances of Orem City were established
and the agents and employees of Orem City testified to their
implementation.

In tort, the plaintiff

is prohibited

from

putting on evidence of damages which result from activities or
situations prohibited by statutes or ordinances.
The plaintiff has attempted to prove damages by establishing the value of an imaginary 2100 square feet of retail space
8

which was not constructed and which, if constructed, would be a
patent violation of the Orem City Ordinances.

It is clear that

the plaintiff in fact suffered no damage in the eyes of the law.
Plaintiff attempted to rebut the undisputed evidence of
insufficient parking by arguing that had the extra space been
constructed, and had plaintiff been aware of the insufficiency
of the parking, plaintiff might have been able to make adjustments to come into compliance with the law. (E.g.. R. 1712.)
This argument is not persuasive.

Plaintiff's evidence of damage

was based on projected income from the use made of the shopping
center at the time of the appraisal.

It would be obviously

unfair and illogical to allow plaintiff to claim that a hypothetical use of the property might have been lawful, but to claim
damages based on an actual, illegal, use.
The undisputed evidence established, as a matter of law,
that plaintiff suffered no damages.

The trial court erred in

failing to direct a verdict for defendant.
POINT II
IT WAS ERROR TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OF ESTIMATED
LOSS WHEN EVIDENCE CONCERNING ACTUAL LOSS
WAS AVAILABLE,
The desired objective in computing damages "is to evaluate
any loss suffered by the most direct, practical and accurate
method that can be employed."
Utah 2d 49, 448 P.2d

Even Odds, Inc. v. Nielson, 22

709. 711

(1968).

In compensating an

injured party for damages to real property two basic rules have
emerged:

the (1) "diminution in value" rule (difference between
9

the value of property before and after an injury); and (2)
"restoration" or "cost of repairs" rule (the cost of repairing
realty to its original condition).
(1965) .

22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 132

See also Leishman v, Kamas Valley Lumber Co., 19 Utah

2d 150, 427 P.2d 747 (1967); Rex T. Fuhriman, Inc. v. Jarrell,
21 Utah 2d 298, 445 P.2d 136 (1963).
burden

of

proving

both measures

of

The plaintiff had the
damages, and

entitled to receive only the lesser amount.

would

be

See Hoaland v.

Klein. 49 Wash. 2d 216, 298 P.2d 1099, 1102 (1956).

It is axiomatic that while damages need not be proved with
exactitude, they must be proved

with

reasonable

certainty.

Sawyers v. FMA Leasing Co., 722 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah 1986).

For

example, in the Sawyers case where the plaintiff was seeking
lost profits, the Court indicated that "[Reasonable certainty
requires more than a mere estimate of net profits.

In addition

to proof of gross profits, there must generally be supporting
evidence of overhead

expenses, or other costs of producing

income from which a net figure can be derived."

Id. (citations

omitted).
A necessary corollary to the rule that damages must be
proved

with

reasonable

certainty

is the

inverse

rule that

"recovery of damages will not be allowed when the trier of facts
must rely upon evidence which leaves those damages uncertain or
speculative."

22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 22 at page 40 (1965).

Furthermore, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to "produce
a sufficient evidentiary basis to establish the fact of damages

10

and to permit the trier of fact to determine with reasonably
certainty the amount of [damages],"

Sawyers, 772 P.2d at 774.

Additionally, in order to recover, the plaintiff must have
"produced the best evidence available . . . to afford a reasonable basis for estimating his loss."

Id., § 25 at page 45.

In

coming up with an estimate, "[e]vents which occur after the
wrong complained of may serve to render the damages sufficiently
certain."

Id., at page 46.

Finally, to authorize recovery for

more than nominal damages, "[t]he damages must be susceptible to
ascertainment in some manner other than by mere speculation,
conjecture,

or

surmise,

and

be

referenced

to

some

fairly

definite standard, such as market value, established experience
or direct inference from known circumstances."

Id.

Application of these principles to the facts of the case at
bar reveals that the evidence plaintiff presented failed to meet
the fundamental requirements of admissible proof and was too
speculative to support an award of damages.
The jury's award of $33,381.00, appears to be the sum of
(1) the estimated lost income from the 2100 square feet of lost
space according to the testimony of Mr. Wright ($72,351.00) (Ex.
12), less the estimated cost of construction of that 2100 square
foot

section

($42,000.00)

(R.

1515),

(2)

the

plaintifffs

undocumented testimony that it paid $3,000.00 to an architect to
redesign the building (R. 1292), (3) $210.00 for certain curb
and gutter work, and (4) $300.00 for miscellaneous extra piping
(R. 1306).

Neither the total sum, nor each element thereof, was

11

proven with the reasonable

certainty

required

by Utah law.

Rather, each element was either speculation or a guess on the
plaintiff's part or an undocumented expense.

In short, not only

did plaintiff fail to produce the best evidence available to
afford a reasonable basis for estimating its loss, it failed to
produce any evidence other than mere conjecture.
A

review

of

the

testimony

of plaintiff's

expert, Mr.

Wright, reveals that speculative nature of plaintiff's damage
evidence.
existed

in

Mr. Wright premised his opinions on conditions which
1977 when he prepared

his

first

report.

Even

assuming, arguendo, that his formula and methods for calculating
plaintiff's damages were sound in 1977, one cannot conclude that
they are sound today.

Further, his opinion was based on a

forecast of the future from 1977.

Such a forecast cannot be

used, even under an income approach to valuation, when at the
date of trial there are 13 years of established experience.
Wright's opinion was patently flawed and as such inadmissible.
See Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Department of Revenue. 7 Or. T.
R. 203, 1977 W.L. 1615, *9 (Or. Tax 1977)(estimate of operating
income was improper where actual data was available); Rosen v.
City of Milwaukee. 72 Wis. 2d 653, 242 N.W.2d 681 (1976).
At the time of the first trial, the plaintiff's shopping
center was new, therefore, it had no rental history upon which
to base an opinion of damages.

Thus, it was perfectly reason-

able to project damages into the future based upon the best
market variables then available.

In contrast, when making that

12

same estimate of damages today, one cannot rely upon the same
unknowns which were relied upon thirteen years ago because many
of the unknowns have become knowns.

Plaintiffs evidence, as

present by Mr. Wright, was flawed and speculative in today's
world

because

it

ignored

"established

inference from known circumstances."

experience

or direct

22 Am. Jr. 2d Damages § 25

at page 46 (1965).
By

relying

on

evidence

which,

by

virtue

of

time

and

experience, has been ejected from the category of "best evidence
available to afford

a reasonable basis

for estimating

it's

loss", id.. plaintiff failed to meet its burden of proof to
produce a sufficient evidentiary basis to establish damages with
reasonable certainty.
Plaintiff's evidence concerning the claim for the curb and
gutter work and miscellaneous piping was similarly speculative.
The only support for the jury's award was the following testimony:
A [by John Price] And the planting areas would be
about .25 cents a square foot and then the you have
got the curb and gutter basically would be $3.50 a
lineal foot and you have got some striping which would
be about $1.20 installed and then you have got the
miscellaneous piping in there and that was about
$300.00 for that and then you got your overhead and
few other just inhouse costs and then you just add
them up and it comes up as I stated $5600.00. But we
can be accurate, you know, present that I am sorry
that I didn't do that.
(R. 1306.)2
2

Total values were extrapolated from this evidence by
plaintiff's attorney in closing argument as follows:
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Because plaintiff failed to present evidence which could
establish with reasonable certainty plaintiff's alleged damages,
plaintiff did not establish a prima facie case.

Defendant's

motion for a directed verdict and its subsequent motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict should have been granted.
CONCLUSION
The uncontroverted evidence established that the additional
space would have been illegal because there was insufficient
parking.
grant

This case should be remanded with instructions to

defendant's

motion

for

judgment

notwithstanding

the

verdict.
In the alternative, this case should be remanded for a new
trial, with instructions that evidence of valuation based on

The first is that Mr. Price testified that the
additional curb and gutter in this area cost him $3.50
per lineal foot.
Mr. Smith testified that there were 60 additional
lineal feet because of the addition of this area here.
It is a simply multiplication problem there, $3.50 per
foot times 60 feet, $210.00.
Secondly Mr. Price testified that it cost him an
additional $300.00 for some miscellaneous piping in
this area. WE believe those are the sums that you
should award as costs incurred in minimizing damages
in addition to the architectural fees.
The undersigned counsel for defendant was not able to
locate any evidentiary support for the assertion that 60
additional feet of curb and gutter was required.

14

estimated

income must be excluded where evidence of actual

income is available.
DATED this 11th day of April, 1988.

JACKSON HOWARD, and
~/T
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing were mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this
11th day of April, 1988.
Bryce D. Panzer, Esq.
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
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APPENDIX "A"

V.-'I'" r !X\l

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAHXOUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

f

PRICE-OREM INVESTMENT COMPANY,
a limited partnership,
Plaintiff,

SPECIAL VERDICT

vs.
ROLLINS, BROWN AND GUNNELL,
INC.,
Defendant.

Civil No. 41,071

Please answer the following questions.

1.

A.

Was Rollins, Brown and Gunnell, Inc. negligent?
YES

B.

^

NO

Was the negligence, if any, of Rollins, Brown and Gunnell, Inc. a

proximate cause of damages to the plaintiff?
YES
2.

A.

NO

Was Price-Orem Investment Company negligent?
YES

B.

NO

Was the negligence, if any, of Price-Orem Investment Company a

proximate cause of damages to the plaintiff?
YES
3.

NO

(If you answered both 1(b) and 2(b) "Yes," answer this question):

Considering all the negligence which proximately caused damages as 100%, what
percentage of that negligence is attributable to:
A.

Rollins, Brown and Gunnell, Inc.?

B.

Price-Orem Investment Company?
TOTAL:

fr

& %
TP %
100%

What sum, if any, would fairly compensate Pricc-Orem Investment
Company for its losses?
DATED this .13

day of June, 1987.

70,3.7

r%

65

APPENDIX "B"

'' vtr -i

re 2 51

BRYCE D. PANZER
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Plaintiff
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

Jr

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PRICE-OREM INVESTMENT COMPANY,
a limited partnership,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT ON JURY VERDICT

vs.
ROLLINS, BROWN AND GUNNELL,
INC. ,

Civil No. 41071
Judge Park

Defendant.

This action came on regularly for trial on June 1, 2, and
3, 1987, before the Honorable Boyd L. Park, District Judge, sitting
with a jury, in Provo, Utah.

Plaintiff Price-Orem Investment

Company was represented by Bryce D. Panzer of the law firm of
Snow, Christensen & Martineau.

Defendant Rollins, Brown and

Gunnell, Inc. was represented by Jackson Howard of the law firm
of Howard, Lewis and Peterson.

A jury of eight people was regularly

impaneled and sworn to try the action.

Witnesses on behalf of the

parties were sworn and examined and documents and exhibits were
admitted on behalf of the parties. After hearing the evidence
and arguments of counsel, and after receiving the instructions

76E

of the court, the jury retired to consider a special verdict and
subsequently returned the special verdict into court with the
following answers:
1.

A.

Was Rollins, Brown and Gunnell, Inc. negligent?
YES

B.

X

NO

Was the negligence, if any, of Rollins, Brown

and Gunnell, Inc. a proximate cause of damages to the plaintiff?
YES
2.

A.

NO

Was Price-Orem Investment Company negligent?
YES

B.

X

X

NO

Was the negligence, if any, of Price-Orem

Investment Company a proximate cause of damages to the plaintiff?
YES
3.

X

NO

Considering all the negligence which proximately caused

damages as 100%, what percentage of that negligence is attributable to:
A.

Rollins, Brown and Gunnell, Inc.?

60%

B.

Price-Orem Investment Company?

40%

TOTAL:
4.

100%

What sum, if any, would fairly compensate Price-Orem

Investment Company for its losses?

$33,861.00

The special verdict was dated June 3, 1987, and signed by
the foreperson, William L. Gappmayer.
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The Court having considered and denied defendant's motions
for a directed verdict and for judgment N.O.V., and various
other post-trial motions having been resolved,
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the law and the special verdict
returned by the jury in the above action, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff, Price-Orem
Investment Company, be and hereby is rendered judgment against
defendant, Rollins, Brown and Gunnell, Inc., in the amount of
$20,316.60, together with costs fixed at $894.20; for a total
judgment of $21,210.80, together with post-judgment interest
on the whole thereof at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per
annum from and after June 4, 1987/, until paid,
DATED this

/

**• -2k

day of tA6S$te^&*<-^,

1987.

BY THE COURT:

y^\

'"fioyd'X. Park
District Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Attorney

iff

HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON

By
Jackson Howard
Attorneys for Defendant
-3-

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Sandra Westergard, being duly sworn, states that she is
employed in the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau,
attorneys for
Plaintiff
and that she served the attached Judgment on Jury Verdict
Civil No.
41071
, upon the following parties by placing
a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Jackson Howard
Attorney for Defendant
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84603

by depositing the same in the United States Mail, first-class
mail, postage prepaid, on the //\0- day of
August
9 1987.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORNM TObefore
TO nef^re me on th.
this ^3? ~
August

day of

, 1987.
psraryPublic
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah

My Commission Expires:
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH COUNTY

PRICE-OREM INVESTMENT CO.,
Plaintiff,

RULING AND AMENDMENT TO
JUDGMENT

-vs-

CASE NO. 41071

ROLLINS, BROWN & GUNNELL,
INC. ,

BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE

Defendant.
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Amended
Motion to Tax Costs.
The Court having considered the motion determines that
the cost of transcripts in the sum of $614.90 are not proper
costs to be awarded the plaintiff and the Order of the Court
dated September 1, 1987 and the Judgment on Jury Verdict dated
September 1, 1987 is hereby amended to read that plaintiff is
granted judgment for costs fixed at $297.30.
Dated this 17th day of September. 1987.
BY THI

XT:

IX/l*. TARK^ JUDGE

cc:

Bryce D. Panzer, Esq,
Jackson Howard, Esq.

APPENDIX "D"

ORDINANCE NO, 232
An Ordinance amending Section 29-3-10 of the Revised Ordinance of Orem
City, Utah, 1959. Repealing any and all Ordinances in conflict and declaring
an emergency.
BE IT ORDAINED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF CI3i CITY,,UTAH:
Section I. That Section 29-3-10-10-1 and Section 29-3-10-10-2 of the
Revised Ordinances of Orem City, Utah, 1959, be amended to read as follows:
29-3-10-10-1
There r V H be provided and maintained at time or erection of
any main building or structure, off-street parking space with adequate
provisions for ingress and egrens by standard-sized automobiles as
hereinafter set forth, ''Said parking space shall >e located on the
same lot as1the building it is to serve.
Whenever existing main buildings are enlarged or j live greased'in
capacity, or"are changed In use, additional-offTStxeetr parking space
shall be provided which will heet the requirements applying to such
enlargement.
A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

H.

Is*

One, two, three,* four, and multiple dwellings* Two (2) off-street
parking Spaces shall be provided for each dwelling unit. (Amended
by Ord. 132: July 15, 1968; amended by Ord. 150: Sept 2, 1969)
Boarding houses, hotels, or rooming houses, "batching'' apartments,
and dwelling units occupied by three or more persons not related
by blood or marriage. At least two (2) off-at^ree^ parking spaces
aha 11; be provided -for each two guaats accx>mjgo<Jated:*in such buildings, or two spaces for each room used for sleeping, purposes,
whichever is greater. (Amended by Ord. 132:: July .15* 1968;
Amended by Ord 150; Sept 2, 1969)
Tourist homes and courts, motels, and motor hotels." One (1)
space for 6ach livihg or sleeping unit plus parking-: for all
accessory uses-dft htetein defined.
Schools.
One (iyoff-street parking spaceC;shall be provided
for each 3.5 seats in an auditorium plus two (2) off-street
spaces shall be provided for each classroom or station.
Clubs and dance halls. One (1) off-street space shall be provided
for each 30 square feet of floor space in the «ain building.
(Amended by Ord. 132: July 15, 1968)
Churches, funeral homes, assembly buildings, sport Arenas, parking
space shall be provided for each three seats in the main assembly
room. Where benches are used, 20 inches of bench space shall be
considered as space for one seat. Where movable chairs are used,
7 square feet shall be considered as space for one seat. (Attended
by Ord 132: July 15, 1968)
Furniture and appliance stores, household equipment or furniture
repair shops. One (1) space for each 600 square feet of gross
leasable areat
Retail ^stares, shops1, etc., except as provided in No. ^ g " above.
Five and one-hilf (5/5) off-st£eet parking spaces for.,each 1000
square feet of floor space contained in the building exclusive of
furnace and mechanical and utility rooms, enclosed walkways, malls,
and restrooms.
Bowling Alleys. Five (5) off-street parking spaces per alley shall
be provided.

2 DEFENDANTS
^ EXHIBIT*!

t%
ax
NO/

-2J.

Wholesale buildings or warehouses.
.75 off-street parking spaces
for each 2000 square feet of gross,, floor area",ribt .75 space for
each person, employed durir^the highest employment shift, .whichever is greater.•

K.

Medical or dental clinics.
office.

Six (6) spaces fof each doctor's
i j ^

L.

Banks, post offices, business and professional offices. Two (2)
spaces plus one (1) space for each 3C0 square feet of -ijloor area .
M. Restaurants. One (1) space for each 2.5 Seats or thr^e (3) spaces
per 100 square feet of floor area, whichever is greater.
!!. Drive-in restaurants. One (1) off-street parking space,for each
petscn employed during the highest employment shift.
0. Hlhiature golf courses or golf driving ranges. One (1) off-street
parking space shall be provided for each hole, station, or tee.
P. Automobile or machinery s-^s and service garages. TJwo (2) spaces
plus one (1) space for each 400 square feet o3E floor fire^.
<J. Day-care centers ,fcr children. Four (4) spaces plus one (1) space
per*500 square feet of floor area.
R. Nursing hones. Four (A) off-street parking spaces plus one (1)
space per each five (5) beds.
S. Hospitals. Two (2) off-street parking spaces per bed.
T. itenufacturing plants, research, or testing laboratories, bottling
plants. One (1) space for each person employed on the highest
employment shift*
The number Aof parking spaces ror uses not ispecitied nerein shall be
determined by the Planning Commission, being guided where appropriate
by the requirements s*~t forth herein for uses of buildings which, in
theqopinion0of the Zoning Administrator or Planning Commission,, are
similar to the use or buildi-3 under considerationj
29-3-10-10^2 • In,>ny residential, ^g^icuijtyral, industrial,' or C-l, H-l, or
R & D"l Zone, no private or public parking lot shall be located within
the front setback which feces on apublic street. In all SQnes, outside
parking space chall be hard surfaced with bituminous mate^a^ or cement.
(Amended by Ord U 2 : July 15, 1963)
Section II, That all Ordinances or parts of Ordinances in conflict herewith
are repealed.
Section III. Any person violating any of the provisions of this,,Ordinance
shall be guilty of misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall $e punished
by a f#ine-in any sum^ip^ exceeding $299.00, or by imprisonment^or a period
of #*irty (30) days/ or both fine ana imprisonment. Each and ev^jry day such
violation shall be continued shall be considered a seoarate offense.
Section IV. Because of impending development within Orem City, UjU}h, *md
more particularly within the land herein abcye described, an emergency exists,
In order to preserve the health, safety, Convenience, and peace and
general welfare of the'City of Orem, and therinhabitants, thereof? this Ordinance shall take effect upon its passage* and first publication in the Or emGeneva Times, a newspaper of general circulation within the City.
PASSED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OP OR©! CITY, UTAH, THIS'' "9th
October
1973.

DAY OF

